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SUBSTANCE AND ARTIFACT 
IN THOMAS AQUINAS
Michael Rota
Introduction
Current interpretations of Aquinas often attribute to him the claim that no artifact is a substance, or, more precisely, the claim that,
(A1) No artifact is a substance in virtue of its form.
Robert Pasnau, for example, tells us that “Aquinas is committed to the 
view that all artifacts are nonsubstances with respect to their form.”1 
And Eleonore Stump writes:
An artifact is thus a composite of things confi gured together into a 
whole but not by a substantial form. Since only something confi gured 
by a substantial form is a substance, no artifact is a substance.2
In fact, however, Aquinas’s position on the metaphysical status of ar-
tifacts is more nuanced than these standard interpretations suppose. 
This paper will examine three hitherto overlooked passages in Aquinas’s 
writings in an attempt to clarify his position, and to show how it (his 
actual position) can overcome some of the philosophical problems which 
pose diffi culties for the stronger claims often attributed to him.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand St. Thomas’s views on the metaphysical status 
of substances and artifacts, one must have some understanding of what 
he means by his Latin analogues of ‘substance’ and ‘artifact.’ Also nec-
essary is some familiarity with his notions of matter and form and the 
distinction between substantial and accidental forms.
Aquinas thinks of any created living thing, whether angel, animal, 
or plant, as a substance (substantia). As most interpreters read him, 
Aquinas also holds that any continuous mass of any one of what Aquinas 
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considered to be the elements (earth, air, fi re, and water) is a substance, 
as is any continuous mass of a mixed body (such as bronze) made up of 
these elements.3
In contemporary philosophical usage it is common to call things like 
houses and axes ‘artifacts.’ Aquinas does sometimes use a Latin ana-
logue of this term, artifi ciatum, which when used substantively means 
‘a thing wrought by art.’ More commonly, though, he uses res artifi cialis 
(artifi cial thing) or the substantive adjective artifi cialis when he wants 
to designate things like houses and axes. His other examples of artifacts 
include a bed, clothing, a knife, and health.4 Aquinas’s use of health 
as an example of an artifact is less puzzling when one recalls that an 
artifact is just a thing produced by art (for health can be brought about 
through the art of medicine).
According to Aquinas, every material object is composed of matter 
and form. On a common interpretation of Aquinas’s notion of form, a 
form is a confi guration or arrangement, and a form of a material object 
is a confi guration of matter.5 The shape of a marble, for example, is a 
confi guration of the matter composing the marble, and so the shape of 
the marble is a form of the marble. Shape can be a helpful initial example 
of form because, as a static arrangement of material parts, it is easily 
conceptualized. But while some forms are merely such static confi gura-
tions, in important cases the confi guration in question is dynamic. That 
is, some forms are dynamic confi gurations, confi gurations which in some 
sense include or involve the motion and causal interaction of parts as 
well as their spatial relationships.6
Proximate matter is a matter-form composite that serves as the 
matter for a higher level composite. For instance, bronze metal, which 
is matter having a certain form, is itself the matter of a bronze statue. 
Prime matter is matter with a complete absence of form. But since matter 
never actually exists without having some form, it’s a misunderstand-
ing of Aquinas’s thinking to conceive of prime matter as a thing in its 
own right. Perhaps prime matter is best thought of as an ontological 
component of a material thing.7
Aquinas distinguishes between substantial forms and accidental 
forms; for our purposes, three differences between them are especially 
important. First, a substantial form is a form which confi gures prime 
matter to be an actually existing substance. An accidental form con-
fi gures an existing subject (or subjects) to have an accident. That is, a 
substantial form (like the substantial form of a human) confi gures prime 
matter directly, while accidental forms (like the form of whiteness) con-
fi gure one or more already existing matter-form composites.8 Second, a 
substantial form makes a thing to be a substance (i.e., accounts for the 
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fact that it is a substance), whereas an accidental form accounts for the 
fact that the thing (or things) it confi gures has some quality, quantity, 
or some other accident. Third, it is due to its substantial form that a 
substance is the kind of thing it is. The substantial form of a substance 
is what accounts for its having the quiddity, or whatness, it has. A rab-
bit, for example, is what it is (a rabbit) because it has the substantial 
form of a rabbit. In contrast, an accidental form does not account for a 
thing’s quiddity.
One can express some of the same points by invoking the notion of a 
thing’s species. A species of a thing, for Aquinas, is a universal which can 
be predicated of that thing, and which, furthermore, describes what that 
thing is. Socrates belongs to the species human, for example, because 
(i) human can be predicated of Socrates and (ii) human tells us what 
Socrates is. It was said above that the substantial form of a substance 
is responsible for the substance’s having the quiddity it does. The same 
point can be made by saying that a substance belongs to the species 
it does in virtue of its substantial form.9 In Aquinas’s terminology, a 
substance is given its species by its substantial form.
II. A STANDARD INTERPRETATION
Background in place, let us now turn to the interpretation of Aquinas’s 
views on substances and artifacts. Commenting on Aristotle’s Metaphys-
ics, Aquinas writes,
some things are not substances, as is especially clear in the domain 
of artifacts, but whatever things are according to nature, with respect 
to being, and constituted by nature, with respect to becoming, are 
true substances.10
Taking this passage in isolation, one might think that Aquinas’s position 
is simply this: no artifacts are substances.
But one should be wary of such an interpretation, if for no other 
reason than because it is quite clearly false. A single stone which has 
been chipped into the shape of a knife is an artifact (it is the product of 
human design), but it is also quite clearly a substance (if any stone is a 
substance). There is no reason to think that what would otherwise count 
as a substance does not count as a substance merely because it has a 
particular shape. As it turns out, the bald claim that no artifacts are 
substances is an oversimplifi cation of Aquinas’s view. When speaking 
more carefully, Aquinas doesn’t assert that no artifacts are substances, 
but that all artifi cial forms are accidental forms:
all artifi cial forms are accidental [forms]. For art operates only upon 
that which is already constituted in complete being by nature.11
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Elsewhere, Aquinas clarifi es his position by saying that artifacts are 
not substances in virtue of their form, though they are substances in 
virtue of their matter:
a man and wood and a stone are natural bodies, a house and 
an axe are artifi cial. Natural bodies, however, appear to be 
substances more than artifi cial bodies, since natural bodies 
are the principles of artifi cial bodies. For art operates upon 
material which nature provides, and a form which is introduced 
through art is an accidental form, such as a shape or something 
of that sort. For this reason artifi cial bodies are not in the 
genus of substance in virtue of their form, but only in virtue 
of their matter, which is natural. That they are substances, 
therefore, is due to natural bodies. For this reason natural 
bodies are substances more than artifi cial bodies are: for they 
are substances not only on account of their matter, but [also] 
on account of their form.12
Aquinas’s idea here is that the artisan works upon one or more natural 
bodies (which are substances) and brings about in them (or it) a new 
form. This new form is introduced by the artisan (using the skills and 
methods of some art), and so it can be called an artifi cial form. The 
artifi cial form makes the thing produced to be the kind of artifact it 
is. Consider a stone-knife (made from a single stone). Here the arti-
fi cial form is the accidental form of shape introduced by the artisan. 
This artifi cial form makes the product to be a knife, rather than just 
a stone (although it remains a stone in virtue of its substantial form). 
The artifi cial form of a house, to use another example, would consist in 
the arrangement of its bricks and timbers and the bonds holding those 
bricks and timbers together.13 Aquinas’s claim appears to be that all 
artifi cial forms (all forms introduced through the working of art) are 
accidental forms.
When Aquinas speaks of the matter of an artifact, he means to refer 
to the proximate matter which is the subject (or are the subjects) of the 
accidental form introduced by the artisan. In the case of the stone-knife, 
the matter would be the single stone substance. In the case of a house, 
the matter would consist of numerous substances (individual bricks and 
beams), all of which would be confi gured by an accidental form ordering 
those individual substances into a certain confi guration. Since proximate 
matter is itself either a single substance or an aggregate of substances, 
Aquinas says that an artifact is a substance in virtue of its matter.
When Aquinas speaks of the form of an artifact, he means to refer 
to the form introduced by the artisan which makes the artifact to be 
the kind of artifact it is, not to the substantial form(s) of the proximate 
matter which makes up the artifact. So Aquinas’s claim that the form of 
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an artifact is not a substantial form should be understood as the claim 
that the form introduced by art (i.e., by the artisan through the applica-
tion of his art), which makes the artifact to be the kind of artifact it is, 
is not a substantial form.
Accordingly, one should understand the claim that
(A1) No artifact is a substance in virtue of its form,
as the claim that
(A2) No artifact is a substance in virtue of the form introduced in it by 
 art, which (form) makes the artifact to be the kind of artifact it is.
And one can understand both these claims better by seeing that they 
are equivalent to:
(A3) For any artifact X of artifact-type K, it is not the case that the 
 form introduced by art which makes X a K is a substantial form.
The texts cited thus far, then, appear to establish that Aquinas holds 
(A1), as interpreted above.
III. GROUNDS FOR A MORE NUANCED INTERPRETATION
Three hitherto overlooked passages in Aquinas’s writings throw doubt 
on this standard interpretation, however. In the fi rst such passage 
Aquinas asserts that
ars virtute sua non potest formam substantialem conferre . . . tamen 
potest virtute naturalis agentis, sicut patet in hoc quod per artem 
inducitur forma ignis in lignis.14
Art is not able to confer a substantial form by its own power . . . 
[but] it is nevertheless able to do so by the power of natural agents, 
as is made clear by the fact that the form of fi re is induced in wood 
through art.
In another passage, occurring in the course of Aquinas’s discussion of 
the Eucharist in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas explicitly discusses a 
case in which human art brings about the generation of a substance. 
According to Aquinas, bread is a substance.15 But it seems that bread 
is a product of human art, and therefore an artifact. Stating an objec-
tion, he writes:
Videtur quod, facta consecratione, remaneat in hoc sacramento forma 
substantialis panis.
Dictum est enim quod, facta consecratione, remaneant accidentia. 
Sed, cum panis sit quiddam artifi ciale, etiam forma eius est accidens. 
Ergo remanet, facta consecratione.16
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It seems that the substantial form of bread remains in this sacrament 
after the consecration.
For, as said above, accidents remain after the consecration. But, 
since bread is a certain sort of artifact, even its form is an accident. 
Therefore [the form of bread] remains after the consecration.
This objection includes the claim that the form of bread must be an ac-
cident because bread is an artifact. In his reply, Aquinas does not deny 
that bread is an artifact. Rather, after arguing that the substantial form 
of bread does not remain after the consecration, he writes:
[N]ihil prohibet arte fi eri aliquid cuius forma non est accidens, sed 
forma substantialis, sicut arte possunt produci ranae et serpentes. 
Talem enim formam non producit ars virtute propria, sed virtute 
naturalium principiorum. Et hoc modo producit formam substan-
tialem panis, virtute ignis decoquentis materiam ex farina et aqua 
confectam.17
[N]othing hinders art from making something whose form is not an 
accident but a substantial form, just as frogs and serpents can be 
produced by art. For art does not produce such a form by its own 
proper power, but by the power of natural principles. And it is in this 
way that [art] produces the substantial form of bread, by the power 
of fi re baking the matter made up of fl our and water.
In this reply Aquinas distinguishes between two ways in which art can 
produce something: (i) by its own proper power and (ii) by the power 
of natural principles. When art produces something by the power of 
natural principles, art can indeed produce something with a substantial 
form, i.e., a substance. Art can produce bread—and frogs and serpents 
as well, Aquinas thinks.
This passage calls into question the accuracy of (A1) as a faithful in-
terpretation of Aquinas’s views. In the remainder of this paper Aquinas’s 
reasons for his general claim that artifacts are not substances in virtue 
of their forms will be discussed. (Along the way, possible problems with 
some of Aquinas’s positions will be noted.) Next, the ST III.75.6 pas-
sage (just quoted) and a third relevant passage in Thomas’s Sentences 
commentary will be examined, with a view toward explaining his dis-
tinction between the two ways art can produce something. With this 
distinction in place, Aquinas’s considered position on the relationship 
between substances and artifacts can be stated. The concluding section 
of this paper will include an attempt to show how Aquinas’s considered 
position can meet many of the philosophical challenges which face the 
view commonly attributed to him.
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IV. ONE-PIECE ARTIFACTS AND MULTI-PIECE ARTIFACTS
With respect to examining Aquinas’s reasons for his general claim that 
artifacts are nonsubstances with respect to their forms, a few words are 
in order about the distinction between one-piece artifacts and multi-piece 
artifacts. Let a one-piece artifact be an artifact whose matter is a single 
substance, like a stone-knife; let a multi-piece artifact be an artifact 
whose matter consists of several distinct substances, like an ordinary 
house. It isn’t too hard to see why Aquinas might have thought that a 
one-piece artifact is not a substance with respect to its form. Take our 
example of a stone-knife. A stone-knife is not a substance because of 
the form imposed on it by the artisan, but because it is already a stone. 
In the case of ordinary one-piece artifacts, the artisan goes to work on 
a previously existing substance and merely modifi es that substance’s 
shape (or perhaps some other accidental property). The artisan imposes 
a form upon the material involved, but the artifact produced is not a 
substance because of that form, which indicates that the form imposed 
by the artisan is not a substantial form.18
Setting one-piece artifacts aside and concentrating on multi-piece 
artifacts, one wonders why multi-piece artifacts can’t be substances 
(with respect to form). To this question let us now turn.
V. GRADES OF BEING AND GRADES OF UNITY
One can better understand Aquinas’s views on artifacts, especially 
multi-piece artifacts, by focusing on what is perhaps Aquinas’s most 
fundamental reason for distinguishing substances from artifacts: in 
Aquinas’s view, substances have being in the fullest sense, while arti-
facts do not.
Arguably, the single most fundamental characteristic of substance, for 
Aquinas, is that it is the primary instance of being. Following Aristotle, 
Aquinas denies that being is univocal. Substances, accidents, genera-
tions and corruptions, and privations and negations are all said to be, 
but in different senses of ‘to be.’19 In Aquinas’s language, substances, 
accidents, etc. have different modes of being. The “most perfect” mode 
of being, says St. Thomas, belongs to
that which has real being without any mixture of privation, and has 
fi rm and solid being, as [a thing] existing by itself, and thus it is in 
the case of substances.20
Throughout his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aquinas repeat-
edly stresses that substance is the primary kind of being, that substance 
has being in an unqualifi ed sense.21
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Now, because of Aquinas’s views on the relationship between be-
ing and oneness (or unity), his view that substances have being in an 
unqualifi ed sense implies that substances have oneness in an unquali-
fi ed sense, which is just to say that, compared to other kinds of things, 
substances are most fully unifi ed or united. To explain: Aquinas distin-
guishes between two senses of ‘one’: (a) one as the principle of number 
and (b) one as convertible with being.22 By ‘one’ taken as the principle 
of number, Aquinas refers to the unit quantity. By ‘one’ taken in the 
second sense Aquinas means something like unity or undividedness. 
Someone might say, for instance, that a person’s heart is undivided; in 
Aquinas’s terminology one could say that such a person’s heart is one. 
One in this sense admits of degrees; this (e.g., a political party) can 
be more unifi ed than that (some other political party). When Aquinas 
holds that one (in the second sense) is convertible with being, he means 
that the more being a thing has, the more unity it has, and vice versa. 
So, since Aquinas holds that substances have being in an unqualifi ed 
sense, one would expect him also to hold that substances are unifi ed in 
an unqualifi ed sense. And, indeed, he states this explicitly:
one in an unqualifi ed sense will be [said] primarily of substance, and 
derivatively of the other [categories].23
Having unity in the fullest sense, then, is a fundamental characteris-
tic of substance. Therefore whatever lacks, in some signifi cant sense, a 
full degree of unity should not count as a substance. But as Thomas sees 
things, artifacts do lack a full degree of unity in a signifi cant sense.24
VI. SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND THE UNITY OF ARTIFACTS
At least one fairly strong argument can be given for the conclusion 
that multi-piece artifacts lack a full degree of unity (and are therefore 
not to be counted as substances). This argument hinges on the claim 
that multiple substantial forms are present in an ordinary multi-piece 
artifact. The general structure of the argument is as follows:
    (1) A multi-piece artifact is an aggregate of many substances, 
    each with its own substantial form.
Therefore, (2) A multi-piece artifact is an aggregate of two or more 
    actual substances.
But,   (3) Whatever is two (or more) actual things cannot be one 
    actual thing, in the fullest sense of one.
Therefore, (4) A multi-piece artifact is not one thing in the fullest
    sense. That is, a multi-piece artifact is not fully unifi ed.
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As regards (3), Aquinas frequently asserts or presupposes that one 
actually existing thing cannot be made up of several actually existing 
things.25 To get an idea of Aquinas’s point here, imagine cramming one 
hundred grapes into a small container, without breaking the skin of a 
single one. Even if the grapes were completely contiguous with each 
other, forming one grape-ish mass uninterrupted by gaps of air, one still 
wouldn’t want to say that the mass of grapes was a fully unifi ed thing. 
One wouldn’t want to say that it was one actually existing thing in any 
robust sense of ‘one.’ If you mashed the grapes together, breaking their 
skins and creating a relatively uniform liquid, then you might have a 
thing which was one thing in a more robust sense. But so long as each 
of the individual grapes continued to actually exist as its own thing 
(without a rupture of its skin), the mass of grapes would just be a very 
closely-fi tted collection of many individual things.
To understand why one might have reason to accept (1), a further 
examination of Aquinas’s notion of substantial form is required. First 
in order, though, is the notion of an integral part. Stump distinguishes 
between integral parts and metaphysical parts.26 An integral part is a 
part which contributes to the spatial extension of the whole of which it 
is a part (e.g., the hand of a human). A metaphysical part, by contrast, 
does not contribute to the spatial extension of its whole (e.g., a human 
soul or the form of redness).
Now, according to Aquinas, a substance’s substantial form is not 
only the form of the whole substance, it is also the form of each of the 
substance’s integral parts.27 Since the substantial form of a substance 
confi gures prime matter directly, every integral part of the substance 
will be informed by its one substantial form.
So the substantial form of an integral part is just the substantial form 
of the whole of which it is a part. Recall that a thing with a substantial 
form is given its species by that form. It seems to follow that the integral 
parts of a substance are given their species by their substantial form, 
which is the substantial form of the whole.
As an illustration, consider an individual human. Aquinas’s claim is 
that the integral parts of a human, e.g., an eye, are confi gured by the 
substantial form of the whole human, i.e., the human soul. A human 
eye, Aquinas thinks, is what it is and has the species it has because it is 
informed by the human soul. Therefore if an eye is separated from a living 
body, one would expect it to lose its species, to cease being what it is when 
a part of a living body. And indeed this is precisely Aquinas’s position: 
“the eye of a corpse, and its fl esh, are so-called only equivocally.”28
Aquinas’s reason for holding this has to do with the proper operations 
or functions of the integral parts of the body. That which retains its spe-
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cies retains the proper function of its species, according to Aquinas.29 
So an eye, for instance, would retain its proper function (sight) apart 
from the body if it retained its species when separated from the body. 
That the eye does not retain its proper function when separated from 
the body indicates that it loses its species when so separated.
It follows from all this that if a multi-piece artifact had just one 
substantial form, its integral parts would be given their species by 
that one substantial form. But this does not seem to be the case. For 
if the integral parts of a multi-piece artifact were given their species 
by the form of the whole artifact, one would expect them to lose their 
species when separated from the artifact. In actuality, however, the 
integral parts of a multi-piece artifact do not lose their species when so 
separated. A brick remains a brick, whether or not it is part of a house. 
Wood remains wood, whether or not it is part of an axe. So a multi-piece 
artifact apparently does not have just one substantial form; rather, each 
of the several integral parts of a multi-piece artifact must have its own 
substantial form, with the result that a multi-piece artifact is an ag-
gregate of many substances, as (1) asserts.
With this argument in mind, one can see that the distinction Aquinas 
so frequently draws between substances and artifacts does not stand 
unconnected from his broader metaphysical views. On the contrary, it 
follows (at least in the case of ordinary multi-piece artifacts) from his 
views that (i) substances are the primary instances of being, and, as 
such, are unifi ed to the highest degree, and (ii) ordinary multi-piece 
artifacts are composed of multiple actually existing substances, each 
with its own substantial form.
Problems
While worthy of consideration, this argument is not without its prob-
lems. For the argument depends on the claim that the integral parts of 
an artifact retain their species when separated from the artifact. But 
this is far from evident. The fact that an eye loses its proper function 
when it is no longer part of a living body, Thomas argued, indicates 
that the eye loses its species when no longer part of a living body. But 
the same point, it seems, can be made about certain integral parts of 
certain artifacts. Consider the seals in an air-conditioning system: when 
taken out of the system they no longer actually perform their function, 
and, what is more, they dry up and eventually lose even their capacity 
to perform their function. If it is said that eyes lose their species when 
separated from a living body, shouldn’t it also be said that air-condition-
ing seals lose their species when separated from the artifact of which 
they are parts?
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Even if this sort of objection can be answered, a larger problem 
remains. There seems to be no theoretical reason why new living sub-
stances couldn’t be produced by human design. A microbiologist who 
signifi cantly modifi es the DNA of a bacterium seems to produce a new 
living thing. Since this new bacterium is a product of human design, it 
seems that it should be counted as an artifact. But since it is a single 
living thing, it should also count as a substance. And so it appears that 
some artifacts are substances with respect to their form, contra (A1).
A project called the Minimum Genome Project raises the possibility 
of other such counter-examples. As Pasnau summarizes, the aim of the 
project is to “determine the minimal confi guration of genes required for 
a living substance.” 30 This knowledge might in turn allow scientists to 
create entirely new organisms “from scratch,” so to speak. If so, these 
new organisms would provide additional counter-examples to (A1).
VII. ARTIFACTS AND EMERGENT WHOLES
The previous section sketched one possible way that Aquinas could 
ground the distinction between substances and multi-piece artifacts, 
namely, by way of the claim that some of the integral parts of a multi-
piece artifact have their own separate substantial forms (with the 
consequence that a multi-piece artifact is not fully unifi ed). A somewhat 
different way to ground the substance-artifact distinction rests on the 
claim that substances are emergent wholes with respect to their mate-
rial constituents, while artifacts are not.31
Consider the following rough description of an emergent whole 
(adapted from Stump):32
W is an emergent whole if and only if the properties and causal pow-
ers of W are not simply the sum of the properties and causal powers 
of the material constituents of W when those constituents are taken 
singillatim, outside the confi guration of W.
Some examples may help clarify this description. If one were to tie a 
bundle of sticks together with a cord, the bundle would have certain 
properties and causal powers not had by any of the sticks taken by itself, 
e.g., the property of weighing over fi ve pounds, the property of taking 
up more than one cubic foot of space, and the causal power of being able 
to ignite a large log when lit. But the bundle would not be an emergent 
whole, since such properties are accounted for simply by summing the 
properties and causal powers of its material constituents (the sticks) 
when considered separately from the bundle. Each stick, separately from 
the bundle, has a certain weight, and the weight of the whole bundle 
is just the sum of these separate weights. Each stick, when existing 
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separately, has the causal power to ignite a certain amount of wood, and 
the causal power of the bundle is a simple aggregate of these powers. 
So too for the volume of the bundle. What would be an example of an 
emergent whole? Perhaps a quantity of water. Consider, for example, 
water’s capacity to form ice crystals at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. Even if 
this capacity in some sense results from the properties of hydrogen atoms 
and oxygen atoms, taken singillatim, the capacity doesn’t seem to be a 
simple aggregate of any of those properties. Water has this capacity due 
in part to the way in which hydrogen and oxygen atoms share electrons 
when they are confi gured so as to make up water—due in part, that is, 
to the confi guration of water’s material constituents. So it seems that a 
quantity of water should count as an emergent whole.
With this understanding of an emergent whole in mind, one might 
be able to distinguish substances and artifacts in this manner:
(5) Substances are emergent wholes, artifacts are not.
Why think (5) is true? An empirical examination of ordinary artifacts 
lends support to (5)—there seems to be little reason to think of a house 
or an axe as an emergent whole. An axe can be used to cut wood, but 
this is just because the blade is sharp (a property it has apart from the 
axe as a whole), and because the handle can be grasped (a property it 
has apart from the axe as a whole). Again, an empirical examination of 
things universally recognized to be substances lends some support to 
(5). Living things seem to be emergent with respect to their material 
constituents. And, as gestured at above, a case can be made that water is 
an emergent whole—so too, perhaps, for other inanimate compounds.
One might wonder how this way of distinguishing substances and 
artifacts relates to our earlier considerations concerning substantial 
forms and unity. They are related in at least one important way: 
Aquinas’s account of substances and artifacts provides us with a 
theoretical explanation of why (5) should, in general, hold true. The 
essential properties and causal powers of a substance follow upon its 
characteristic confi guration, i.e., its substantial form. (Water has the 
essential properties and causal powers it does because of the way in 
which the prime matter of water is confi gured.) If an ordinary artifact 
does not have one substantial form which makes it the kind of artifact 
it is, then it has constituent parts which have their own substantial 
forms. In other words, an ordinary artifact has constituents that are 
themselves actually existing substances, and the artifact is simply an 
aggregate of these constituent substances. Now, one would expect that 
the properties and causal powers of the artifact as a whole will be some 
sort of simple function of the properties and powers of the constituent 
substances, considered as parts of the whole (i.e., as they are when 
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incorporated into the whole). But since the artifact’s constituents have 
the same substantial forms whether incorporated into or apart from 
the artifact, they (the constituents) will have the same essential prop-
erties and causal powers whether or not they are incorporated into the 
artifact. And this implies that the properties and causal powers of the 
artifact as a whole will be some sort of simple function of the proper-
ties and powers of the constituents taken apart from the whole. By our 
description of an emergent whole, it follows that ordinary artifacts will 
not be emergent wholes.
The situation is different for substances, in which those constituent 
parts which have their own substantial forms outside of the substance 
lose their substantial forms when incorporated into the substance. Sup-
pose some substance S1 (e.g., water) is generated when substances S2 
and S3 (hydrogen gas and oxygen gas) come together under favorable 
conditions. The substantial forms of S2 and S3 do not remain in S1, on 
Aquinas’s theory, so one would not expect the properties and causal 
powers of S1 to be a simple function of the properties and powers of 
S2 and S3. The fact that the substantial forms of S2 and S3 are lost, 
and replaced by the substantial form of S1, explains why water is an 
emergent whole with respect to hydrogen and oxygen.
An interesting point emerges from these considerations. It appears 
that the empirical question of whether or not something is an emer-
gent whole provides us with a criterion to determine whether a given 
thing should count as one single substance rather than as an aggregate 
of many substances. If something appears to be an emergent whole, 
perhaps this is good evidence that the several substantial forms of its 
constituent parts have been replaced by a single substantial form, which 
accounts for the new properties and causal powers of the whole.
But after suggesting that the notion of emergence might ground the 
substance-artifact distinction, Stump raises a doubt:
the promise of this way of distinguishing substance and artifact is 
considerably diminished by considering, say, styrofoam. On the face 
of it, styrofoam appears to be an artifact insofar as it is the product 
of human design, but it seems closer to water than to axes as regards 
emergence.33
Artifacts, by defi nition, are things wrought by human art or skill. So 
Styrofoam is an artifact. But Styrofoam seems to be as different from its 
atomic constituents in its properties and causal powers as does water 
from hydrogen and oxygen. Thus it does not seem that no artifacts are 
emergent wholes.
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VIII. ART WORKING THROUGH THE POWER 
OF NATURAL PRINCIPLES
To sum up, there are at least two major problems for the position com-
monly attributed to Aquinas. First, it seems that new living things 
could be produced by art, and therefore that some artifacts could be 
substances with respect to their form, contra (A1). Second, it seems 
that some artifacts are emergent with respect to their parts, which 
means that one cannot distinguish substances and artifacts in terms 
of emergent wholes. This in turn calls into question the hard and fast 
distinction between artifacts and substances that is often attributed to 
Aquinas (or at least calls it into question in the absence of another good 
way to make that distinction).
One way of trying to salvage (A1) is to deny that such things as geneti-
cally engineered bacteria and Styrofoam are really artifacts. Whatever 
its philosophical merits (or defects), this proposal wouldn’t be accepted by 
Aquinas. The etymology of ‘artifact’ implies that ‘artifact’ is just another 
name for a thing wrought by art, skill, or design—and Aquinas accepts 
this defi nition. In several places he uses ‘artifi cial things’ (artifi cialia) 
and ‘artifacts’ (artifi ciata) simply as synonyms for ‘things which are by 
art’ (quae sunt ab arte) or ‘things which come to be by art’ (illa fi unt ab 
arte). 34 So, for Aquinas, artifacts are just things which come to be by 
human art or skill.
This conclusion is confi rmed by ST III.75.6. The fi rst objection in-
cludes the claim that bread is an artifact. If Aquinas were going to take 
the position that not all things produced by art should be counted as 
artifacts, one would expect him to go on to deny the claim that bread is 
an artifact. But rather than denying this claim, he presupposes it, say-
ing that art “produces the substantial form of bread” by means of the 
power of natural principles. So Aquinas accepts the claim that bread 
is an artifact.
Since Aquinas thinks that bread, as well as certain frogs and serpents, 
are at the same time substances with respect to form and artifacts, it 
is clear that Aquinas would reject (A1) as a hard and fast rule. What 
then is Aquinas’s position? To answer this question, it will be helpful to 
examine further Aquinas’s distinction between the two ways in which 
art can produce something. As noted, Aquinas employs this distinction 
at ST III.75.6. A parallel passage from Aquinas’s earliest major work 
provides additional light on his thinking here:
Praeterea. Panis est quoddam artifi ciale. Sed formae artifi cialium 
sunt accidentia, ut patet in 2 Phys. Cum ergo accidentia maneant, 
videtur quod forma panis secundum quam est panis, maneat.35
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Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis ars non possit introducere for-
mam substantialem per seipsam, potest tamen introducere virtute 
naturae qua utitur in sua operatione sicut instrumento: sicut patet in 
hoc quod aquam in vaporem convertit, et aerem in ignem igne medi-
ante. Et similiter cum occiditur animal recedente anima, alia forma 
substantialis succedit, sicut generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Ita 
etiam per commixtionem farinae et aquae et ustionem ignis potest 
consequi forma aliqua substantialis quae sit forma substantialis per 
quam panis est panis.36
Further, bread is an artifact of a certain sort. But the forms of artifacts 
are accidents, as is shown in Book II of the Physics. Therefore, since 
the accidents [of bread] remain [after the consecration], it seems that 
the form of bread on account of which it is bread remains.
To the third point it should be said that although art is not able to 
introduce a substantial form just by itself, it nevertheless is able to 
introduce [a substantial form] by the power of nature, which it uses 
as an instrument in its own operation. This is shown in the fact that, 
by means of fi re, [art] converts water into vapor, and air into fi re. And 
similarly, when an animal is killed and its soul withdraws, another 
substantial form takes its place, for the generation of one thing is the 
destruction of another. And in this way, through the mixture of fl our 
and water and the burning of fi re, there can follow a substantial form, 
which is the substantial form by which bread is bread.37
To understand what Thomas is getting at, in the above passage and in 
ST III.75.6, one should begin by noting that natural things have certain 
causal powers to interact in such a way as to yield new substances. 38 
To return to our earlier example, hydrogen gas and oxygen gas have 
causal powers to combine to form a new substance, water, when they 
are brought together in appropriate circumstances. Natural things have 
natural potencies39 for substantial change.
Second, consider that if a human artisan arranges natural things 
appropriately, he can bring it about that they do interact and yield new 
substances. This is what Aquinas thinks is going on when: (i) someone 
applies fi re to water and vapor is produced, (ii) someone applies fi re to 
air and produces fi re, (iii) someone kills an animal, the animal ceases to 
exist, and a new substantial form begins to inform the corpse, (iv) a baker 
applies fi re to fl our and water, and bread (a new substance) is produced, 
and (v) magicians use magic to produce frogs and serpents.40
Third, distinguish between two ways that art can work. Call a case 
where art makes use of the natural potencies of natural things for sub-
stantial change a case of (i) art working through the power of natural 
principles. In such cases, the artisan arranges the conditions appro-
priately and lets nature take its course. As Aquinas notes, the artisan 
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uses natural things as instruments. Call a case where art produces 
something, but doesn’t make use of natural potencies for substantial 
change a case of (ii) art working through its own proper power. We have 
a case of art working through its own proper power whenever art works 
in such a way as not to bring about the actualization of the potencies 
for substantial change of the materials involved.
It follows from the above, fi nally, that when art works through the 
power of natural principles, it produces a substance, and when it works 
through its own proper power, it doesn’t.
Interesting questions remain about how Aquinas’s more careful state-
ments (considered in this section) fi t with the more typical statements 
cited in section II, but these questions must fall to another occasion.41
CONCLUSION
From all this it appears that Aquinas’s considered view about substances 
and artifacts is not (A1), but,
(A4) Any thing produced by art is an artifact. Art working though its 
 own proper power cannot produce a thing that is a substance in 
 virtue of its form. But art working through the power of natural 
 principles can, and does. Therefore some artifacts are substances 
 in virtue of their form.
This more nuanced interpretation allows us to deal with the two prob-
lems that plagued (A1), the position commonly attributed to Aquinas. 
The fi rst problem involved a class of counter-examples to (A1), namely 
artifi cially produced living things. While an artifi cially produced living 
thing would provide a counter-example to (A1), it would not provide a 
counter-example to (A4), since (A4) concedes that those artifacts pro-
duced by art working through nature will be substances (with respect to 
form). The generation of new living things through the modifi cation of 
DNA would seem to take advantage of the natural potencies of certain 
matter to be confi gured into a living thing, and so would constitute a 
case of art working through nature.
The second problem called into question the hard and fast distinction 
between artifacts and substances commonly attributed to Aquinas, inso-
far as the existence of artifacts like Styrofoam suggest that one cannot 
distinguish substances and artifacts in terms of emergent wholes. But 
it now appears that Aquinas doesn’t intend to make this hard and fast 
distinction, and so the fact that Styrofoam seems to be an emergent 
thing doesn’t falsify any principle of Aquinas’s.42
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